Here: If there is the no objective morality, no perceived moral action actually has any moral value.
Is that better?
Consider what an 'is' is. An 'is' is simply a fact; a state of affairs that exists. So if I can't get an 'ought' from an 'is', and we apply that rule across the board, then there is NO fact from which we can derive an 'ought'. There's literally no reason why we ought to behave in a moral way, including 'God commands it', because 'God commands it' is (assuming it's true) an 'is' statement.
If facts have no bearing on whether or not we ought to do something, I'd say that's a profoundly difficult problem to surmount in understanding why anyone should behave morally, believer or no.
Here's the thing:
You're telling me that if any idea I have about morality is subjective, then it doesn't actually have any 'moral' meaning at all. It's akin to William Lane Craig's assertion that, without God, ethics is illusory; deeper meaning is illusory; morality is illusory. This is nonsense.
Do you have consciousness? Where is it? Can you show it to me? Of course not. Your own consciousness is a completely subjective experience; it's the single most subjective experience any of us can have. Yet not many people (sane ones anyway) will think that, because consciousness is subjective, that it is illusory.
This is why I balk when someone says something like 'It is not irrational to ignore the fact that torture is harmful to the person being tortured, because some people don't agree that it does'. It might not be harmful on some absurd, cosmic scale, but you have to be utterly irrational to conclude that torturing someone doesn't do them any harm. You have to be completely irrational to conclude that, because someone else might feel they can ignore this fact about torture, that their opinion on it carries equal weight to the considered view of someone who knows it does.
This goes right back to the question of whether or not (supposing morality is commanded by God) God has good reasons for saying "X" is right or wrong. If he has reasons, then those reasons are brute facts about existence that compel his command, and those brute facts about existence are what give "X" its moral value; not God's command.
If he doesn't have good reasons, then it's only his commands that God "X" it's moral value. Then if it's only his commands that give something its moral value, that means there are no good reasons why "X" is right or wrong, except that God said so. THIS means that God can say 'rape is bad' in one moment, and 'rape is good' in the next, because he's not bound to any good reason for any of his commands.
But anyway, I feel like I'm repeating myself at this point.